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Reconsidering Copyright’s Constitutionality
Dr. Graham J. Reynolds
Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia
(forthcoming in the Osgoode Hall Law Journal (issue 53.3))
1. Introduction
Do provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe the right to freedom of
expression as protected under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(Charter)? 1 This question, while it has not been explicitly addressed by the Supreme Court of
Canada (SCC), has been addressed by a number of lower Canadian courts.2 In the leading
Canadian case to have addressed the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression
and copyright – Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin – Michelin & Cie v. National
Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada)
(Michelin) – Teitelbaum J., of the Federal Court (Trial Division), held that specific provisions of
the Copyright Act did not infringe the Charter-protected right to freedom of expression and, even
if they did, they would be justified through the application of a s. 1 analysis. Since Michelin,
these conclusions have been treated by Canadian courts as settled.3

1

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11.
2
See, for instance, Queen v James Lorimer & Co [1982] FCJ No 229 FCTD, Queen v James Lorimer & Co [1984] 1
FC 1065, Canadian Tire Corp v Retail Clerks Union, Local 1518 (1985), 7 CPR (3d) 415; 36 ACWS (2d) 4; [1985]
FCJ No 1005; [1985] ACF no 1005 Federal Court of Canada - Trial Division, Rôtisseries St.-Hubert Ltée v. Le
Syndicat des Travailleurs(euses) de la Rôtisserie St.-Hubert de Drummondville (C.S.N.) [1986] 17 CPR (3d) 461,
Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin – Michelin & Cie v. National Automobile, Aerospace,
Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) [1996] FCJ No 1685 (QL); [1997] 2 FC 306
FCTD, Fraser Health Authority v. Hospital Employees' Union (2003), 2003 BCSC 807; 226 DLR (4th) 563; 25
CPR (4th) 172; 122 ACWS (3d) 544; [2003] BCJ No 1192 British Columbia Supreme Court, Corporation Sun
Média c. Syndicat canadien de la function publique 2007 QCCS 2943, [2007] JQ no 6007 Cour supérieure du
Québec, Canwest Mediaworks Publications Inc. v. Horizon Publications Ltd. (2008), 2008 BCSC 1609; 173 ACWS
(3d) 431; [2008] BCJ No 2271, Drolet v Stiftung Gralsbotschaft (F.C.) (2009), 2009 FC 17; [2010] 1 FCR 492;
[2010] 1 RCF 492; [2009] FCJ No 38; [2009] ACF no 38 Federal Court.
3
See, for example, Canwest 2008 (supra, note 2) and Drolet (supra, note 2). This is the case despite the SCC’s
articulation of the purpose of copyright having evolved since Michelin. The evolution of the purpose of copyright in
Canada is discussed in greater depth in section 2(d) of this paper. For other works that address this topic, see, for
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In this paper, I argue that these conclusions ought not to be treated by courts as settled;
that based on current copyright and Charter jurisprudence, a Canadian court could determine that
provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to freedom of
expression. In so doing, this paper adds to the voices of those who have argued that Canadian
courts should reconsider the relationship between copyright and the Charter right to freedom of
expression, including David Fewer, Jane Bailey, Carys Craig, and Bita Amani.4

instance, Daniel J. Gervais, ‘The Purpose of Copyright Law in Canada’ (2005) 2 UOLTJ 315. In a separate work, I
argue that the approach adopted in Michelin to the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright relies on now-invalid approaches to both copyright and to the Charter right to freedom of expression and,
as a result, that this approach is itself invalid and must be reconsidered.
4
David Fewer, ‘Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression and the Limits of Copyright in Canada’
(1997) 55 U Toronto Fac L Rev 175, Jane Bailey, ‘Deflating the Michelin Man’ in Michael Geist (ed), In the Public
Interest (Irwin Law 2005), Carys J Craig, ‘Putting the Community in Communication: Dissolving the Conflict
Between Freedom of Expression and Copyright’ (2006) 56 Univ of Toronto LJ 75, Bita Amani, ‘Copyright and
Freedom of Expression: Fair Dealing Between Work and Play’ in Rosemary J Coombe, Darren Wershler and Martin
Zellinger (eds), Dynamic Fair Dealing: Creating Canadian Culture Online (University of Toronto Press 2013). I
also build on my previous work in this area: Graham Reynolds, ‘A Step in the Wrong Direction: The Impact of the
Legislative Protection of Technological Protection Measures on Fair Dealing and Freedom of Expression’ (2006) 5
CJLT 179. For other works that address the intersection of freedom of expression and copyright in Canada, see Joe
Conforti, ‘Copyright and Freedom of Expression: A Privilege for New[s] Reports’ (1990) 5 IPJ 130, Ysolde
Gendreau, ‘Canadian Copyright Law and its Charters’ in Jonathan Griffiths and Uma Suthersanen (eds), Copyright
and Free Speech (Oxford University Press 2005), Ysolde Gendreau, ‘Copyright and Freedom of Expression in
Canada’ in Paul Torremans (ed), Copyright and Human Rights (Kluwer Law International 2004), Alex Colangelo
and Alana Maurushat, ‘Exploring the Limits of Computer Code as a Protected Form of Expression: A Suggested
Approach to Encryption, Computer Viruses, and Technological Protection Measures’ (2006) 51 McGill LJ 47, Sarah
Sklar-Heyn, ‘Battling Clearance Culture Shock: Comparing US Fair Use and Canadian Fair Dealing in Advancing
Freedom of Expression in Non-Fiction Film’ (2011) 20 Cardozo J Int'l and Comp L 233, Margaret Ann Wilkinson
and Charles A. Painter, ‘Shifting the Balance of Copyright Control for Photographic Works in Canada’ (1998-1999)
13 Intellectual Property Journal 353, Teresa Scassa, ‘Intellectual Property on the Cyber-Picket Line: A Comment on
British Columbia Automobile Assn v Office and Professional Employees' International Union, Local 378’ (2002) 39
Alta L Rev 934, Ian Kerr, Alana Maurushat and Christian Tacit, ‘Techical Protection Measures: Tilting at
Copyright's Windmill’ (2003) 34 Ottawa L Rev 6, Ian Kerr and Jane Bailey, ‘The Implications of Digital Rights
Management for Privacy and Freedom of Expression’ (2004) 2 J of Info, Comm & Ethics in Soc 87, Abraham
Drassinower, ‘A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law’ (2003) 16 Can JL & Juris
3, Myra J Tawfik, ‘International Copyright Law: W[h]ither User Rights? ’ in Michael Geist (ed), In the Public
Interest (Irwin Law 2005), Gregory R Hagen and Nyall Engfield, ‘Canadian Copyright Reform: P2P Sharing,
Making Available and the Three-Step Test’ (2006) 3 UOLTJ 477, EAC Mohammed, ‘Parody as Fair Dealing in
Canada: A Guide for Lawyers and Judges’ (2009) 4 JIPLP 468, Graham Reynolds, ‘A Stroke of Genius or
Copyright Infringement? Mashups and Copyright in Canada’ (2009) 6 SCRIPTed 639, Graham Reynolds, ‘Towards
a Right to Engage in the Fair Transformative Use of Copyright-Protected Expression’ in Michael Geist (ed), From
“Radical Extremism” to “Balanced Copyright” (Irwin Law 2010), Graham Reynolds, ‘All the Game’s a Stage:
Machinima and Copyright in Canada’ (2010) 13 JWIP 729, Graham Reynolds, ‘Necessarily Critical? The Adoption
of a Parody Defence to Copyright Infringement in Canada’ (2010) 33 Man LJ 241, Graham Reynolds, ‘The Impact
of Canadian Copyright Laws on the Voices of Marginalised Groups: Towards a Right to Rewrite’ (2010) 48 Alta L
Rev 35, Teresa Scassa, ‘Trademarks Worth a Thousand Words: Freedom of Expression and the Use of the
Trademarks of Others’ (2012) 53 Les Cahiers de droit 887, Katie Sykes, ‘Towards a Public Justification of
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This paper will proceed as follows. In Part 2, in reliance on copyright term extension as
my case study, I will discuss the scope of the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression in the context
of copyright.5 I will argue that the SCC’s freedom of expression jurisprudence suggests that the
unauthorized act at the heart of the case study considered in this paper conveys or attempts to
convey meaning and thus constitutes protectable expression under s. 2(b); that this act should not
be excluded from the scope of the Charter right to freedom of expression due to the method or
location of expression; and that key provisions of the Copyright Act – namely the general
infringement provision (s. 27(1)) read in context with the provisions granting rights in works (ss.
3 and 5), the primary remedy provisions (ss. 34, 38.1 and 42), the provisions detailing defences
and limitations to copyright infringement (ss. 29-30.9), and the provision setting out the term of
copyright in works (as amended) (s. 6) – limit or restrict freedom of expression in purpose and
effect, thus infringing the Charter guarantee.6
In Part 3, I will draw upon SCC jurisprudence and related commentary to discuss how the
s. 1 analysis might be applied in the context of the case study considered in this paper. I will
argue that the SCC’s s. 1 jurisprudence suggests that the objective of the impugned provisions of
the Copyright Act is pressing and substantial and that there is a rational connection between this
objective and the impugned provisions. However, I will further argue that the impugned
Copyright’ (2003) 61 UT Fac L Rev 1, Daniel Gervais, ‘Making Copyright Whole’ (2008) 5 UOLTJ 1, David
Vaver, ‘Intellectual Property: The State of the Art’ (2000) 116 LQR 621, David Vaver, ‘Copyright Defences as User
Rights’ (2013) 60 J Copyright Soc'y USA 661, Pascale Chapdelaine, ‘The Ambiguous Nature of Copyright Users'
Rights’ (2013) 26 IPJ 1 at 18, Sunny Handa, Copyright Law in Canada (Butterworths 2002) at 95, David Vaver,
Copyright Law (Irwin Law 2000) at 22, David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law (2nd edn, Irwin Law 2011) at 4650. See also Graham Reynolds and others, Canadian Intellectual Property Law (Toronto, Emond Montgomery
2013). One section of this casebook addresses the intersection of freedom of expression and copyright (see pp 173177). See, as well, Rebecca Tushnet, ‘Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common
with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation’ (2000) 42 BC L
Rev 1 for a similar analysis in the US context.
5
Like its articulation of the purpose of copyright, the SCC’s view of the correct scope of s. 2(b) has also changed
over time. For a work that describes, in detail, the evolution of the SCC’s articulation of the scope of s. 2(b), see
Jamie Cameron, “The Past, Present, and Future of Expressive Freedom under the Charter” (1997) 35 OHLJ 1.
6
Copyright Act. Bailey, as well, has argued that ‘[a] strong argument can be made that the [Copyright] Act’s
prohibition against expressing certain content constitutes a prima facie section 2(b) violation’ (supra note 4 at 144).

4
provisions may be considered to be overbroad, and as a result may fail the minimal impairment
branch of the proportionality test. As well, a court could find that the deleterious impact of the
provisions may not be outweighed by their benefits. As a result, these provisions may not be
justified under a s. 1 analysis.
Part 4 will address remedies. In the event that the impugned provisions noted above are
held to infringe the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression and are not saved by s. 1, what might
be the appropriate remedy? While a court could sever part of the offending provision (or
provisions), my analysis of s. 1 jurisprudence suggests that a court could find that the most
appropriate remedy would be for the Court to declare the Copyright Act, in its entirety, to be of
no force or effect (albeit with a temporary suspension of invalidity). Although appearing at first
glance to be a radical outcome, such an action would be consistent with both past Charter
jurisprudence and, more generally, with the division of authority between courts and Parliament.
My purpose in writing this paper is to call into question the view that arguments
challenging the constitutionality of provisions of the Copyright Act on Charter right to freedom
of expression grounds are ‘bound to fail’ (as was stated in one lower court decision).7 Rather, as
I will establish, a Canadian court could determine that provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act
unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression. As such, it is important for
Canadian courts to consider, and not to reject out of hand, the question of copyright’s
constitutionality. As Margaret Radin writes, ‘[i]t may be that the copyright law that we have can
easily meet the freedom of expression test, but that does not mean that we should not apply the
test to see whether the law meets it’.8

7

Canwest Mediaworks Publications Inc. v. Horizon Publications Inc. 2009 BCSC 391, [2009] BCWLD 6704 at
para. 37.
8
Margaret Jane Radin, ‘The Rule of Law in the Information Age: Reconciling Private Rights and Public Values’
(2009) [4] JL Phil & Culture 83 at 104.
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2. Copyright and freedom of expression (s. 2(b))
a. Case study: copyright term extension
As noted by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), “Charter
litigation decisions cannot be made in a factual vacuum”.9 As such, in seeking to address the
question of copyright’s constitutionality, it is necessary to do so in the context of a specific
factual matrix. The case study that I rely on for the purposes of this paper is as follows: an action
is brought against A for copyright infringement for making available works the copyright in
which would have expired were it not for a legislative amendment to the Copyright Act, passed
after the works had been created, that extended the term of copyright for both future and existing
works. In this case study, it is assumed that the act complained of prima facie infringes
copyright, and is not saved by any defence to copyright infringement. The defendant (A) is thus
arguing that specific provisions of the Copyright Act (both the provision setting out the term of
protection for copyrighted works as well as other core provisions) unjustifiably infringe their
Charter right to freedom of expression.10
I have selected this case study because a recent amendment to the Copyright Act,11 as
well as possible future amendments to the Copyright Act,12 suggest that in the not too distant
future, a case could be brought in which the constitutionality of similar provisions of the
Copyright Act is challenged. However, I do not mean to suggest that this is the only type of
9

Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94.
As a preliminary issue, it should be noted that the SCC has held, in Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Metropolitan
Stores (MTS) Ltd. [1987] 1 SCR 110 at para. 15, that statutory provisions are not presumed to be consistent with the
Charter. As noted by Beetz J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, ‘the innovative and evolutive character of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms conflicts with the idea that a legislative provision can be presumed to
be consistent with the Charter’.
11
As part of a budget implementation act that received royal assent on June 23, 2015, the Government of Canada
extended the term of copyright protection in published sound recordings (both existing and not-yet-created) from,
broadly speaking, 50 years after publication to 70 years after publication. See Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 at
ss. 23(1)(b) and 23(1.1). Both existing works and works not-yet-created receive the benefit of this extension.
12
On February 4, 2016, Canada signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, one of the articles of which
requires contracting parties to protect works, performances, and phonograms for the term of the natural life of the
author plus 70 years after the author’s death (Article 18.63).
10
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situation that might result in a court determining that provisions of the Copyright Act
unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression, or that my conclusions are
restricted to the specific case study presented. Rather, I present this case study as an illustrative
example of some of the constitutional issues raised by Canadian copyright law.13
b. Do the activities in question have expressive content?
As noted by Cory J. in Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), the SCC has interpreted the
Charter right to freedom of expression broadly, in order to ‘extend the guarantee under the
Canadian Charter to as many expressive activities as possible.’14 Aside from certain
circumstances in which the method or location of an expression will result in the expression not
being protected under the Charter right to freedom of expression (an issue that will be addressed
in the next section), as noted by Cory J. in Libman, ‘any activity or communication that conveys
or attempts to convey meaning is covered by the guarantee of section 2(b) of the Canadian
Charter’.15
In making a copyrighted work available, is A conveying or attempting to convey
meaning? One question that must be addressed in considering this question is whether s. 2(b),
despite protecting an ‘infinite variety of forms of expression’, only protects expression that

13

Furthermore, I have intentionally not included additional details in this case study, such as a specific work or
individual, in order to avoid drawing attention away from the broader question of whether a Canadian court could
determine that provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to freedom of
expression (the central focus of this paper, as noted above). For works the focus of which is copyright term
extension, see, for instance, Marci A. Hamilton, “Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Copyright”
(1996) 14 Cardozo Arts & Ent L J 655, Arthur R. Miller, “Copyright Term Extension: Boon for American Creators
and the American Economy” (1998) 45 J Copyright Soc’y USA 319, Tyler T. Ochoa, “Patent and Copyright Term
Extension and the Constitution: A Historical Perspective” (2001) 49 J Copyright Soc’y USA 19, Dennis S Karjala,
“Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension Legislation” (2002) 36 Loy LA L Rev 199, Richard A Epstein, “The
Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act” (2002) 36 Loy LA L Rev 123, Marvin Ammori,
“The Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension” (2002) 16 Harv J L & Tech 287, Martin Kretschmer et al, ‘Creatvity
Stifled? A Joint Academic Statement on the Proposed Copyright Term Extension for Sound Recordings’, (2008)
30:9 EIPR 341.
14
Libman v Quebec (Attorney General) [1997] 3 SCR 569 at 591-592.
15
Ibid at para. 31.
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originates from the individual claiming the benefit of the s. 2(b) right?16 The question of whether
a party can convey meaning, for s. 2(b) purposes, using the copyright-protected expression of
another was answered, in the affirmative, in Michelin. In his reasons for judgment, Teitelbaum J.
concluded that despite the fact that ‘“Bibendum” is not the fruits of the defendants’ own
labours,’ CAW is conveying meaning (and thus engaging in expression) through the use of the
modified Bibendum on its pamphlets and leaflets.17 As he noted, ‘[a]t its minimum, the meaning
in this instance is that Michelin workers should band together in the union before they are
stomped into submission by the corporate powers symbolized by the “Bibendum”’.18 Carys
Craig echoes Teitelbaum J.’s conclusion that CAW’s use of Bibendum conveys meaning, writing
that ‘the defendants’ depiction of Bibendum contributed something to the public understanding,
generating new meaning by recontextualizing a powerful communicative symbol, expressing it
anew and with a radically different message’.19
Some might argue, however, that rather than conveying or attempting to convey meaning,
all that A is doing is engaging in a purely physical act, unconnected to expression. Some courts
have interpreted acts that might otherwise be seen as expressive as purely physical.20 The result
of this interpretation is that the act is not considered to be protectable expression under the
Charter right to freedom of expression. One instance in which this occurred was in R v. Ludacka
16

Weisfeld v Canada (CA) (1994), [1995] 1 FC 68 FCA at para. 26. Craig argues that ‘[t]hat the expression
originates with the speaker is simply not a requirement of an attempt to convey meaning before it can fall within the
freedom-of-expression guarantee…If someone writes ‘War is Terrorism!’ on a placard and hands it to me, I would
be expressing myself by waving that placard. The expression may not be mine in the copyright sense of having
originated from me as an author, but by demonstrating my support of that message, I would undoubtedly be engaged
in an act of self-expression’ (supra note 4 at 83-84,emphasis in original).
17
Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin – Michelin & Cie v. National Automobile, Aerospace,
Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) [1996] FCJ No 1685 (QL); [1997] 2 FC 306
FCTD at para 83. See also Coles Book Stores Ltd v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1991), 6 OR (3d) 673 at para. 80.
18
Michelin at para 85.
19
Carys J Craig, ‘Putting the Community in Communication: Dissolving the Conflict Between Freedom of
Expression and Copyright’ (2006) 56 Univ of Toronto LJ 75 at 112.
20
See, for instance, Irwin Toy Ltd v. Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 927 at para. 41, where Dickson C.J.
and Lamer and Wilson JJ write that ‘[i]t might be difficult to characterize certain day-to-day tasks, like parking a
car, as having expressive content’.
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(Ludacka), a case heard by the Court of Appeal for Ontario (OCA), the judgment of which was
delivered by Dubin C.J.O.21 Ludacka dealt with the question of whether a series of explicit sex
acts, performed on stage, constituted expression and, thus, was prima facie protected by the
Charter.22 Dubin C.J.O. held that the explicit sexual acts complained of were ‘purely physical
activity which does not convey or attempt to convey meaning’.23 Applying this decision in the
context of A’s actions, it could be argued that the act of making available copyrighted works is
‘purely physical activity’ that does not convey or attempt to convey meaning.
The approach adopted in Ludacka, however, can be critiqued on several grounds. First, it
is inconsistent with the expansive conception of s. 2(b) repeatedly affirmed by Canadian courts.
In Ontario Adult Entertainment Bar Assn v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) (Ontario Adult
Entertainment), a case decided by the OCA post-Ludacka in which it was held that explicit lap
dancing is expression, it was noted that ‘courts have taken an expansive view in approaching the
characterization of conduct as expression’ and that ‘competing values and interests that arise
when viewing certain impugned conduct’ which might otherwise lead a court to determine that
conduct does not constitute expression, are more properly assessed under a s. 1 analysis.24
Second, the decision of the OCA in Ludacka can also be critiqued on the basis that it is
inconsistent with prior SCC jurisprudence. In Butler (which was decided by the SCC four years
before the OCA’s decision was handed down in Ludacka), Sopinka J. stated that ‘I cannot agree
with the premise that purely physical activity, such as sexual activity, cannot be expression’.25
Sopinka J. distinguished ‘purely physical activity’ (that is to say physical activity in which one is
21

R v Ludacka (1996), 105 CCC (3d) 565, 28 OR (2d) 19 OCA.
Ibid.
23
Ibid at paras. 24-25.
24
Ontario Adult Entertainment Bar Assn v Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) (1995), 35 OR (3d) 161 OCA at
para. 50.
25
R v Butler [1992] 1 SCR 452 at para. 72. As Dickson C.J. and Lamer and Wilson J.J. held in Irwin Toy, even the
act of parking a car can have expressive content (Irwin Toy at para. 41).
22
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not intending to convey a meaning, and does not convey a meaning) from the sale and rental of
‘“hard core” videotapes and magazines as well as sexual paraphernalia’.26 He held that ‘while
indeed “physical”’, the sale and rental of these items ‘conveys ideas, opinions, or feelings’.27
Despite involving an element of physicality, in that individuals must engage in some physical act
or process in order to make a work available for others to access, Butler and Ontario Adult
Entertainment suggest that the act of so doing is a physical act through which information,
expression, ideas, and opinions are conveyed, and thus should be seen as an expressive act.
c. Is the activity excluded from that protection as a result of either the location or the
method of expression
Notwithstanding the SCC’s characterization of the Charter right to freedom of expression
as a broad and expansive right, some acts that convey or attempt to convey meaning are excluded
from the scope of protectable expression on the basis of either the method or the location of the
expression. In their majority reasons in Montréal (City), McLachlin C.J. and Deschamps J.,
wrote that these exclusions should not be interpreted broadly. Instread, as they note, ‘expressive
activity should be excluded from the protective scope of s. 2(b) only if its method or location
clearly undermines the values that underlie the guarantee’, namely self-fulfillment, democratic
discourse, and truth-finding.28
i.

Method of expression
The sole method of expression to have been excluded from protection by the SCC under

s. 2(b), subsequent to Irwin Toy, is violent expression (or expression that takes the form of
violence). In Montréal (City), McLachlin C.J. and Deschamps J. noted that although it ‘may be a
means of political expression and may serve to enhance the self-fulfillment of the perpetrator’,
26

Butler at para. 2.
Ibid at para. 64.
28
Montréal (City) v 2952-1366 Québec Inc [2005] 3 SCR 141, 2005 SCC 62 at para. 72.
27
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violent expression is excluded from protection under s. 2(b) on the basis that it ‘prevents
dialogue rather than fostering it[; … ] prevents the self-fulfillment of the victim rather than
enhancing it[; …] [a]nd … stands in the way of finding the truth rather than furthering it’.29
Some might describe the unauthorized use of copyrighted works as a violent act, as an act
that harms the author of the work, or as an act that is equivalent to a violent act.30 The scope of
the ‘violence’ exclusion from s. 2(b), however, has been confined by Canadian courts to acts of
violence committed by one individual against another, or to threats of violence.31 While it is
possible that in certain instances, individuals could engage in the unauthorized use of copyrightprotected expression in a manner that threatens violence against an individual (for instance
combining clips of movies and sending them to an individual as part of a threat of violence
against that individual or against a group with which the individual identifies), in most
circumstances, excluding uses of copyrighted works from the protection of s. 2(b) of the Charter
on the basis that unauthorized use of copyrighted works harms the author of the work (or is
equivalent to a violent act or a threat of violence) would be to adopt an interpretation of violence
inconsistent with the way in which violence has been interpreted by Canadian courts in the
context of this step of the s. 2(b) analysis.
Violence aside, are there any other ways in which A’s action could be considered to
‘undermine[] the values underlying s. 2(b)’ on the basis of the method of expression, and be
excluded from the scope of protectable expression on this basis?32 A’s making available of works
the copyright in which would have expired were it not for a retroactively-applied legislative
29

Ibid at para. 72.
For instance, in an article published in the Guardian Newspaper, Alexis Petridis describes how the singer
Madonna characterized the unauthorized leak of music from her album Rebel Heart as ‘a form of terrorism’ and
‘artistic rape’ (Alexis Petridis, ‘Madonna: I did not say, ‘Hey, here’s my music, and it’s finished.’ It was theft’ The
Guardian (December 21, 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/music/2014/dec/21/madonna-album-hack-livingstate-terror> ).
31
See, for instance, Irwin Toy and R. v. Geoghegan 2004 ABPC 127.
32
Montréal at para. 72.
30
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amendment to the Copyright Act extending the term of copyright in works could prevent
dialogue, in that it could, for instance, lead to authors choosing not to write additional works out
of concern that their works will be disseminated without their authorization. Furthermore, to the
extent to which the self-fulfilment (or ‘self-actualization’33) of the original authors in the case
study described above is linked to their ability to control or manage the dissemination of their
copyrighted works, their self-fulfilment may be limited by the widespread dissemination of their
copyrighted works by A. Finally, the unauthorized use of copyrighted works by A may ‘stand[]
in the way of finding the truth’ if it results in authors who might otherwise contribute to the
truth-finding process choosing not to write, or publishers who might disseminate works that
would otherwise contribute to the truth-finding process choosing not to disseminate works.34
Canadian courts have held, however, that in situations where the method of expression
cannot be separated from its content, the expression is entitled to protection under s. 2(b)
regardless of whether the method of expression might ‘undermine[] the values underlying s.
2(b)’.35 In the case study outlined above, the method through which the message is conveyed –
when the content of the expression is stripped from the equation – does not conflict with the
values underlying freedom of expression. The making available of copyrighted works, in and of
itself, does not undermine or conflict with the values that have been said to underpin freedom of
expression. Rather, the argument that this method of expression undermines the values that
underpin freedom of expression ‘rests on its content’ (namely the fact that the works made
available are works that are copyrighted).36 As a result, this argument, as was held by McLachlin

33

R v. Sharpe [2001] 1 SCR 45, 2001 SCC 2 at para. 76.
Montréal at para. 72.
35
Ibid at para. 72. See, for instance, Canadian Broadcasting Corp v Canada (Attorney General) 2011 SCC 2, [2011]
1 SCR 19 at para. 3, 52-53.
36
Montréal at para. 68.
34
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C.J. and Deschamps J. in Montréal (City), ‘cannot be considered in addressing the issue of
whether the method … of the expression itself is inimical to s. 2(b)’.37
The argument that in the case study introduced above the method of expression cannot be
separated from its content, and thus the expression should not be excluded from the scope of
protectable expression, is supported by SCC jurisprudence relating to choice of language and
artistic expression. Both of these types of expression have been said by the SCC to be instances
in which the method or form of expression is inseparable from its content. In Reference re: s.
193 and 195.1(1)(C) of the Criminal Code (Reference re: s. 193), for instance, Lamer J. wrote
that:
In my view the choice of the language through which one
communicates is central to one's freedom of expression. The choice of
language is more than a utilitarian decision; language is, indeed, an
expression of one's culture and often of one's sense of dignity and selfworth. Language is, shortly put, both content and form.38
Art is another type of expression in which form and content is linked. Lamer J., in
Reference re: s. 193, wrote that ‘just as language colours the content of writing or speech, artistic
forms colour and indeed help to define the product of artistic expression’.39 Lamer J. went on to
state that:
Without settling the matter conclusively, I am of the view that at the
very least a law that makes it an offence to convey a meaning or
message, however distasteful or unpopular, through a traditional form
of expression like the written or spoken word or art must be viewed as a
restriction on freedom of expression, and must be justified, if possible,
by s. 1 of the Charter.40
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Like language and art, the choice to express oneself using copyrighted content can be
seen, in many instances, as ‘an expression of cultural identity, and in many cases is an expression
of one’s identity’.41 For instance, using a copyrighted image as part of a person’s personal web
page, wearing a t-shirt with a logo of a product or company a person identifies with or supports,
creating a mix tape or CD or playlist, combining two existing works into one new work, sending
a link to a song to a friend, and myriad other acts, can all be seen as individuals expressing their
identity through the use of copyrighted works. As well, again like language and art, the use of
copyrighted content ‘colours the content and meaning of expression’.42 A different message is
conveyed by the use of Bibendum in the pamphlets prepared by the CAW than by a description
of the business practices engaged in by Michelin that the CAW finds objectionable. The use of
copyrighted content, therefore, is ‘both content and form’.43 As Craig writes, ‘[t]he question of
whether a work as a whole is subject to copyright and, if so, what elements of the work fall
within the scope of the owner’s interest cannot be divorced from an inquiry into the nature and
content of the expressive work’.44 As such, as was held in CBC 2011, the method of expression –
namely the use of copyrighted content – ‘cannot be considered separately from the content and
cannot serve as a basis for excluding the expressive activity from the protection of s. 2(b) of the
Charter’.45
Furthermore, although different from the laws at issue in Reference re: s. 193, in which
the SCC considered the constitutionality of certain provisions relating to prostitution (including
the section of the Criminal Code that prohibited communications in public for the purpose of
prostitution), copyright can be conceptualized as ‘a law that makes it an offence to convey a
41
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meaning or message … through a traditional form of expression like the written or spoken word
or art’.46 Instead of prohibiting specific messages, or types of communications, the provisions of
the Copyright Act prohibit the manner in which those messages are expressed (namely through
the use of copyrighted content).
Reference re: s. 193 and CBC 2011, taken together, suggest that the act described in the
case study outlined above should not be excluded from the scope of protectable expression on
the basis of the method of expression, and that – instead – the provisions of the Copyright Act
restraining this type of use should be seen as a restriction on freedom of expression that requires
justification through a s. 1 analysis.
ii.

Location of expression
Telteilbaum J., in Michelin, took the view that expression that makes use of copyrighted

works should be excluded from protection under s. 2(b) on the basis that copyright-protected
expression, a species of private property, could not be used in the service of freedom of
expression.47 In reaching this conclusion, Teitelbaum J. drew parallels between the use of
copyright-protected expression (considered by the SCC to be property, as described below), and
expressing oneself on private property.48
In recent years, the SCC has clarified the test for excluding messages conveyed on either
private or public property from the scope of protectable expression under s. 2(b). As noted by
Deschamps J. in CBC 2011, citing to Montréal (City), ‘for … the location of the conveyance of a
message to be excluded from Charter protection, the court must find that it conflicts with the
values protected by s. 2(b), namely self-fulfilment, democratic discourse and truth finding’.49
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In Montréal (City), McLachlin C.J. and Deschamps J. affirmed that expression taking
place on private property is generally not protected by s. 2(b). However, their judgment implies
that the reason why expression taking place on private property falls outside of the protected
sphere of s. 2(b) is not because property rights exist outside of the scope of the Charter. Rather,
it is because of the way in which the Charter has been interpreted as applying to government
action.50 In instances in which private property rights do not involve state-imposed limits on
expression, the Charter would not apply (as ‘state action is necessary to implicate the Canadian
Charter’) .51 However, in situations where private property is intertwined with state-imposed
limits on expression, these state-imposed limits may be challenged using the Charter right to
freedom of expression.52
The SCC, on multiple occasions, has referred to copyright as a species of property.53 If
copyrights are to be considered property rights, however, they do not exist independently of the
Copyright Act. Rather, they are rights created by the state through the passage of copyright
legislation. As Estey J. wrote in Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc:
copyright law … is statutory law. It neither cuts across existing rights
in property or conduct nor falls between rights and obligations
heretofore existing in the common law. Copyright legislation simply
creates rights and obligations upon the terms and in the circumstances
set out in the statute.54
50
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Given both that copyright is a ‘creature of statute’, and that it limits the expression of
some in order to advance the interests (both expression and otherwise) of others (for instance
authors, publishers, and the public more generally), the property rights granted under the
Copyright Act can be said to involve ‘state-imposed limits on expression’.55 They are thus
subject to the Charter, and a Charter analysis must be conducted in the same manner in the
context of copyright as with other legislation. As Craig writes, ‘[b]ecause copyright is an interest
conferred by government regulation, it follows that it can be subjected to Charter scrutiny and
limited in the name of the rights enshrined in the Charter’.56 Contrary to the conclusion reached
by Teitelbaum J. in Michelin, the formal conception of copyright as a private property right
should not result in the exclusion of expression that makes use of the copyrighted works of
others from the scope of s. 2(b) of the Charter on the basis of the location of expression.57
d. ‘If the activity is protected, does an infringement of the protected right result from
either the purpose or the effect of the government action’?58
Section 27(1) is the general infringement section under the Copyright Act. It provides that
‘[i]t is an infringement of copyright for any person to do, without the consent of the owner of the
copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the copyright has the right to do’.59 The
rights of copyright owners are set out in s. 3 of the Copyright Act. These rights include the right
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to reproduce a work, to perform a work in public, and to communicate the work to the public by
telecommunication, in whole or in substantial part.60
Section 5 of the Copyright Act sets out the conditions for subsistence of copyright.
Section 5(1) notes that provided certain citizenship/residence requirements are met, ‘copyright
shall subsist in Canada, for the term hereinafter mentioned, in every original literary, dramatic,
musical and artistic work’.61 The term of copyright is addressed in ss. 6-12 of the Copyright Act.
The general term of copyright in Canada is the life of the author plus 50 years from the end of
the calendar year in which the author dies.62 The hypothetical provision outlined in the case
study above extends the term of copyright protection in works. This extension, in the context of
the hypothetical provision, is applied both to existing and future works.
Section 34(1) of the Copyright Act details the remedies that are available to copyright
owners. It states that ‘[w]here copyright has been infringed, the owner of the copyright is, subject
to this Act, entitled to all remedies by way of injunction, damages, accounts, delivery up and
otherwise that are or may be conferred by law for the infringement of a right’.63 Statutory
damages are provided for in s. 38.1 of the Copyright Act, and criminal remedies are addressed in
s. 42.64 The main defence to copyright infringement in Canada is fair dealing. This defence is set
out in ss. 29-29.2 of the Copyright Act. Other defences are provided for in ss. 29.21-30.9
(inclusive).65
Do these provisions, in purpose or effect, infringe s. 2(b)? First, what is the purpose of
the provisions in question? Teitelbaum J., in Michelin, defined the objective of the Copyright Act
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as ‘[t]he protection of authors and ensuring that they are recompensed for their creative energies
and works’.66 However, this view of the purpose of copyright – referred to by Abella J. as
‘author-centric’ – represents the ‘former framework’ for copyright.67 In its place, the SCC –
beginning with Binnie J.’s majority decision in Théberge - has stated that there are two
objectives to copyright, namely to ensure that copyright owners receive a just or fair reward, and
to advance the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and
intellect.68
What is the relationship between these two objectives? This question is beyond the scope
of this paper to address in detail. However, given the importance, to a Charter analysis, of
properly characterizing the objective of impugned provisions, as will be described in more detail
below, this question is one that a court faced with a challenge to copyright’s constitutionality will
need to grapple.69 One way in which this relationship could be framed positions one of the two
purposes articulated by Binnie J. in Théberge as acting in the service of the other. Under this
view of the purpose of copyright in Canada, the just rewards provided in the Copyright Act are
the means through which the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of
the arts and intellect is advanced. Support for this articulation of copyright’s purpose can be
found in Cinar Corp, in which McLachlin C.J. wrote that copyright ‘seeks to ensure that an
author will reap the benefits of his efforts, in order to incentivize the creation of new works’.70
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This conception of copyright – under which the purpose of the provisions of the
Copyright Act described above is to incentivize the creation of expression by granting copyright
owners rights in works of expression, as well as the ability, through the state, to enforce
infringements of those rights – is the conception adopted by this paper for the purposes of this
analysis. Under a different view of copyright’s purpose(s), however, both the s. 2(b) analysis and
the s. 1 analysis might proceed differently.
In seeking to determine whether core provisions of the Copyright Act infringe s. 2(b) in
purpose or effect, the example used in Irwin Toy of a rule against handing out pamphlets is
informative. As noted by Dickson C.J., Lamer J. and Wilson J. (who wrote the reasons for
judgment for the majority), this rule – despite ‘purport[ing] to control litter’ – ‘is “tied to
content”’.71 That is to say, ‘[t]he rule aims to control access by others to a meaning being
conveyed as well as to control the ability of the pamphleteer to convey a meaning’.72 Like the
rule at issue in Irwin Toy, the provisions of the Copyright Act noted above are also ‘tied to
content’.73 They ‘control access by others to a meaning being conveyed’, namely the meaning of
the copyrighted work, and any meanings that are added to that work by parties that re-work it;
they also ‘control the ability of [the unauthorized user of copyrighted content] to convey a
meaning’.74 In so doing, the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act limit, deny, and abridge
expression.
In addition to arguing that the purpose of the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act is
to limit or abridge expression, it can also be argued that the effect of the impugned provisions of
the Copyright Act is to deny or abridge freedom of expression. As noted in Irwin Toy by the
71
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majority, in order to demonstrate that the effect of government action is to deny or abridge
freedom of expression, ‘a plaintiff must state her claim with reference to the principles and
values underlying the freedom’, namely truth-seeking, participation in decision-making, and selffulfillment and human flourishing.
In the context of the case study that is the focus of this paper, the effects of the impugned
provisions are to deny or abridge freedom of expression. For A, the application of the Copyright
Act restricts or limits their ability to disseminate expression. It also restricts the ability of the
public to receive expression from A. As a result, both A as well as the public more generally are
prevented from using this expression to the degree that they otherwise might, in the furtherance
of truth-seeking, social and political decision-making, and self-fulfillment.
Thus far in this paper, I have argued that A’s making available of copyrighted works
constitutes expression, should not be removed from the scope of protectable expression due to
the method or location of expression, and that certain core provisions of the Copyright Act
infringe the s. 2(b) guarantee of freedom of expression both in purpose and effect. Unless they
can be justified under s. 1 of the Charter, these provisions will be declared of no force or effect.
3. Section 1 of the Charter, applied in the context of copyright
a. Are the measures prescribed by law?
The first question to be addressed under a s. 1 analysis is whether the impugned
provisions are ‘limits prescribed by law’ within the meaning of s. 1.75 In R. v. Therens, Le Dain
J. (dissenting on other grounds) stated that ‘[t]he limit will be prescribed by law within the
meaning of s. 1 if it is expressly provided for by statute or regulation, or results by necessary
implication from the terms of a statute or regulation or from its operating requirements’.76 The
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impugned measures that are the focus of this paper are expressly provided for in the Copyright
Act. As a result, the provisions of the Copyright Act are limits prescribed by law for the purposes
of the s. 1 analysis.
b. Pressing and substantial objective?
The next part of the s. 1 analysis asks whether the objective of the impugned provisions is
‘sufficiently important to justify overriding a Charter freedom’.77 The SCC has noted the ‘great
importance’,78 to the s. 1 analysis, of properly characterizing the objective of the impugned
provisions. Deschamps J. has written that ‘all steps of the Oakes test are premised on a proper
identification of the objective of the impugned measure’.79 Of particular concern is the need to
ensure that the objective is not articulated in an overbroad manner. As stated by McLachlin J., in
RJR-MacDonald Inc v. Canada (Attorney General), ‘[i]f the objective is stated too broadly, its
importance may be exaggerated and the analysis compromised’.80 One possible negative
consequence of overstating the legislative objective is that it may be difficult to establish that the
provision (the ‘means adopted to promote’ the objective) is minimally impairing.81
What are the objectives of the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act? As described
above, for the purposes of this analysis, I adopt the view that the objective of the impugned
provisions of the Copyright Act is to incentivize the creation of expression by granting copyright
owners rights in works of expression, as well as the ability, through the state, to enforce
infringements of those rights.
The objective of the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act is consistent with this
broad objective, as outlined above. That is to say, in order to incentivize the creation and
77
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dissemination of works of the arts and intellect, the Copyright Act grants, to authors of works (s.
5), a set of time-limited (ss. 6-12) rights (s. 3) with respect to these works; permits authors to
assign those rights to others (s. 13(4)); makes it an infringement of copyright to engage in any of
the acts that the copyright owner has the exclusive right to do without the authorization of the
copyright owner, provided no defences or limitations exist to render the act non-infringing (ss.
27, and 29-30.9); and makes available, to copyright owners, a number of remedies in the event
that their rights have been infringed (ss. 34, 38.1 and 42).82
Is the objective of the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act pressing and
substantial? In JTI, McLachlin C.J. (who delivered the judgment for the Court), citing to Peter
Hogg’s Constitutional Law of Canada, noted that ‘[a]n objective will be deemed proper if it is
for the realization of collective goals of fundamental importance’.83 A wide range of objectives
have been considered by the SCC to be pressing and substantial.84 Although the list of objectives
held to be pressing and substantial is lengthy, however, not every objective suggested by the
government has been found to be pressing and substantial.85
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In Michelin, Teitelbaum J. stated that he ‘would have had no difficulty in determining
that the objective of the Copyright Act’ (which he defines as the protection of authors and
ensuring that they are recompensed for their creative energies and works) was ‘pressing and
substantial’.86 He also noted that ‘the pressing and substantial nature of the Copyright Act's
objective is buttressed by Canada's international obligations in treaties like the Berne Convention
of 1886 as revised in Berlin in 1908 and in Rome in 1928’.87
As noted above, the objective of the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act is
conceptualized differently today than it was in 1996. However, for several reasons, I suggest that
a Canadian court would consider the objective of the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act,
as outlined above, to be pressing and substantial. First, as noted above, the SCC has considered a
wide range of objectives to be pressing and substantial, demonstrating that the threshold for such
a determination is one that is not overly onerous for governments to meet. As The Constitutional
Law Group notes, ‘[t]he courts seem prepared to regard almost any purpose … as “pressing and
substantial”’.88 Second, the granting of a just reward in order to incentivize the creation and
dissemination of expression is connected to ‘the realization of collective goals of fundamental
importance’.89 One such goal is the encouragement and dissemination of works of arts and the
intellect. A wide range of benefits flow to the public from the existence of works of the arts and
intellect, including benefits tied to truth-seeking, democratic discourse, and self-fulfillment.
Third, this objective is neither ‘trivial’ nor ‘discordant with the principles integral to a free and
conventional standards of propriety, independently of any harm in society’ (Butler at para. 92), and ‘the promotion
of marriage’ (Nova Scotia v Walsh 2002 SCC 83 at para. 184).
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democratic society’.90 Rather, the objective of the impugned provisions advances principles
integral to a free and democratic society such as the freedom of expression interests of authors
and the public. Fourth, as noted by Teitelbaum J., the pressing and substantial nature of the
objective is supported by international treaties, ratified by Canada, that protect copyright.91 Fifth,
the pressing and substantial nature of the objective can also be seen to be supported by
international human rights conventions ratified by Canada, including the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.92 Vaver writes
that ‘[w]hen the Supreme Court speaks of copyright law’s need to achieve a “proper balance
between protection and access”, the language echoes the customary international law of human
rights treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948’.93
The arguments outlined above strongly suggest that should this issue come before a
Canadian court, the objective of the impugned provisions noted above would be seen as being of
pressing and substantial importance ‘sufficient to justify some limitation on freedom of
expression’.94 A separate question to be addressed, however, is whether the specific limitations
set out in the Copyright Act can be justified. This question can be answered through the
application of the proportionality branch of the s. 1 analysis.
c. Do the impugned measures satisfy the proportionality branch of the s. 1 analysis?
There are three parts to the proportionality branch of the s. 1 analysis. First, it must be
asked whether the limit is rationally connected to the objective; second, whether the limit
minimally impairs the right in question; and third, whether the benefits outweigh the deleterious
90
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effects. In applying this test, it is important to recall the statement in Whatcott that ‘perfection is
not required. Rather the legislature's chosen approach must be accorded considerable deference.
… [w]e must ask whether Parliament has chosen one of several reasonable alternatives’.95
i.

Is the limit rationally connected to the objective?
It is not necessary for the government to conclusively establish that there is a rational

connection between the objective and the means used to promote the objective (the limitation).
Rather, as noted by McLachlin C.J., writing for the majority of the SCC in Alberta v. Hutterian
Brethren of Wilson Colony, ‘[t]he government must show that it is reasonable to suppose that the
limit may further the goal, not that it will do so’.96
In JTI, McLachlin C.J., writing for the Court, noted that although this step is not
‘unimportant’, ‘[f]ew cases have foundered on the requirement of rational connection’.97 Some
cases, however, have foundered on the requirement of rational connection. For instance, in RJR
Macdonald, McLachlin C.J. held that one provision of the Tobacco Products Control Act failed
the rational connection test on the basis that ‘there is no causal connection based on direct
evidence, nor is there, in my view, a causal connection based in logic or reason’ between ‘the
objective of decreasing tobacco consumption and the absolute prohibition on the use of a tobacco
trade mark on articles other than tobacco products’.98
How might the rational connection test be applied in the context of the impugned
provisions of the Copyright Act? In Michelin, Teitelbaum J. held that ‘the objectives of the
Copyright Act are rationally connected to an action for copyright infringement’, concluding that:
95
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There is a definite and efficient link between the goal of protecting the
interests of authors and copyright holders by granting them a monopoly
on the right to use and reproduce their works and the ability to enforce
those interests in an action for copyright infringement.99
As noted above, as a result of the SCC’s re-articulation of the purpose of copyright –
beginning in Théberge and refined through a series of cases including Cinar Corporation – the
rational connection analysis must now be framed differently. The question that should be asked,
in determining whether this part of the proportionality analysis is met, is whether there is a
rational connection between the objective of granting a just reward to copyright owners in order
to incentivize the creation and distribution of expression, and the means of doing so, namely
through the grant of limited, assignable, exclusive statutory rights (including the ‘ability to
enforce those [rights] in an action for copyright infringement’).100
Is there ‘conclusive evidence or empirical evidence of a rational connection’ between this
objective and the means chosen to achieve this objective?101 A number of commentators have
challenged the idea that copyright incentivizes the creation of expression.102 Julie Cohen, for
instance, writes that ‘the incentives-for-authors story is wrong as a descriptive matter’.103 Kai
Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman also question whether the incentives provided for by
copyright are necessary to incentivize creativity or innovation in all contexts.104
However, the question of how to incentivize the creation and dissemination of expression
can be considered to be a ‘complex social problem[]’, which would mean – following JTI – that
Parliament’s decision on how to address this problem ‘should be accorded considerable
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deference’.105 Furthermore, it can be argued that through the application of ‘reason and logic’, a
rational connection can be established.106 It is not unreasonable to accept that the provision of
financial incentives for the creation of works of expression may encourage at least certain
individuals to create works of expression.
As well, the SCC has stated that ‘widespread international practice’ can be cited as a
‘relevant indicator’ of a rational connection.107 Granting limited rights to authors in order to
incentivize the creation and dissemination of works of expression can be said to be a widespread
international practice.108 Cohen writes that:
[t]he statement that the purpose of copyright is to furnish incentives for
authors has attained the status of a rote incantation. Court opinions and
legislative histories are peppered with references to the incentives for
authors rationale. Judges recite it as a matter of course when deciding
cases, and legislators, lobbyists, and other interested parties invoke it in
debates about proposed amendments to the copyright laws. Copyright
scholars frame policy problems in terms of an ‘incentives-access’
tradeoff, and that framing in turn affects our analysis of what judges and
legislators do.109
Given the above discussion, it is suggested that a Canadian court would find the impugned
provisions of the Copyright Act are rationally connected to the objective.110
ii.

Minimal impairment
The second part of the proportionality test can be referred to as the minimal impairment

inquiry. In R. v. Oakes, the SCC required courts to demonstrate, in order to satisfy this branch of
the proportionality analysis, that ‘the means … should impair “as little as possible” the right or
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freedom in question’.111 Jamie Cameron notes that ‘[n]ot surprisingly, a consensus … emerged
that Oakes propounded a strict standard of justification which the Court subsequently found
impossible to implement’.112
In R v. St-Onge Lamoureux, Deschamps J., writing for the majority, stated that:
In the minimal impairment inquiry, the court must not second‑guess
Parliament and try to identify the least intrusive solution. In Downey,
this Court stated that ‘ … the issue is “whether Parliament could
reasonably have chosen an alternative means which would have
achieved the identified objective as effectively”’.113
In Whatcott, the range of alternatives from which Parliament could safely choose is referred to as
the ‘range of reasonably supportable alternatives’.114
How, then, might the minimal impairment analysis be applied in the context of the
impugned provisions of the Copyright Act?115 As described above, in this paper I argue that the
objective of the Copyright Act is to provide a fair reward for creators and copyright owners in
order to incentivize the creation of works of the arts and intellect.116 Parliament has chosen to
attempt to achieve this objective through the means of limited exclusive rights granted initially to
authors, which can be then transferred from authors to other parties.
This was not the only means through which Parliament could have provided a fair reward
for creators and copyright owners in order to incentivize the creation of works of the arts and
111
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intellect. This objective could also have been met, for instance, through government grants, tax
incentives, certificates, medals, or prizes.117 However, it has been accepted, in many jurisdictions
around the world, that the creation of limited property rights in intangible expression through the
vehicle of copyright legislation is an effective way to reward authors; and, in so doing, to
incentivize the creation and distribution of works of the arts and intellect. Given this, the
decision to enact a Copyright Act through which exclusive time-limited rights are granted in
expression, with access to specific remedies, and subject to certain defences, could be seen as
falling squarely within the range of ‘reasonably supportable alternatives’ from which Parliament
could choose in order to fulfill its objective.118
Despite being a reasonable alternative, however the impugned provisions (or portions of
them) could still be found to be not minimally impairing on the basis that they are overbroad.119
In Whatcott, the SCC listed a number of criticisms relating to overbreadth.120 Rothstein J.,
writing for the Court, noted that:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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In the context of the facts of Whatcott, it was held that the ‘key to minimizing both subjectivity
and overbreadth’ is ‘[l]inking the test for hate speech to the specific legislative objectives’.122
Could the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act be held to fail the minimal
impairment part of the proportionality test on the basis that they are overbroad? In applying the
first criticism noted in Whatcott in the context of overbreadth, one must ask whether the
impugned provisions are overbroad on the basis that they ‘capture[] more expression than is
intended or necessary’.123 As noted in Whatcott, ‘[p]reventative measures should only prohibit
the type of expression expected to cause the harm targeted’.124
Since Théberge, it has been accepted by Canadian courts that copyright in Canada is
primarily an economic right.125 As articulated by Binnie J. in Théberge, the rewards provided by
copyright are economic rewards, and the type of harm targeted is economic harm.126 In light of
the SCC’s judgment in Cinar Corp, and consistent with the view of the purpose of copyright
adopted in this paper, the economic harm targeted can be said to be the harm that flows from acts
that undermine the economic incentive for individuals to create.
If the objective of copyright in Canada is to grant a fair reward to copyright owners in
order to incentivize the creation of works, then – as per Whatcott – the only type of expression
that should be prohibited is that which impacts upon this incentive function: that denies
copyright owners a just or fair economic reward and in so doing negatively impacts the
economic incentive that authors have to create works, or, perhaps, the economic incentive that
distributors have to disseminate works.
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For persons for whom the promise or possibility of economic gain acts as an
incentivizing factor for the creation or dissemination of works, acts taken by individuals to deny
these persons a just or fair economic reward might deter them from creating or disseminating
such works in future. Cinar Corp provides an informative example. ‘Dreamer[s]’ like Robinson
might not invest ‘years meticulously crafting an imaginary universe for an educational children’s
television show’ if this show could simply be produced (and re-produced) by another party
without that party being required to compensate Robinson.127 Similarly, intermediaries such as
production companies, and distributors such as publishing houses or movie studios, might not
invest in the production and dissemination of expression if another publishing house or movie
studio could simply re-produce the same work (in a manner that substitutes for the original work)
without legal sanction and/or being required to provide compensation.
It could be argued, however, that the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act ‘capture[]
more expression than is … necessary’ to prevent the harm targeted; that they prohibit types of
expression other than that which denies copyright owners a just or fair economic reward and in
so doing negatively impact the economic incentive that authors have to create works, or the
economic incentive that distributors have to disseminate works.128 This is due, in large part, to
the structure of the Copyright Act, through which the combined action of the infringement
provision (s. 27) and the rights-granting provision (s. 3 and s. 5) means that any taking of a
substantial part of a copyrighted work – whether or not it impacts upon the just or fair economic
reward to which copyright owners are entitled under the Copyright Act – constitutes a prima
facie act of copyright infringement.129
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More specifically, the hypothetical provision mentioned in the context of the case study
outlined above could also be argued to be overbroad. Increasing the term of copyright protection
in works might incentivize the creation of certain works that would not have been created should
the term of protection remain at its current length of the life of the author plus 50 years.
However, the retroactive aspect of this provision, in particular, might fall afoul of the s. 1
analysis. As written by Stevens J. in his dissenting judgment in the US Supreme Court decision
in Eldred v. Ashcroft, ‘[n]either the purpose of encouraging new inventions nor the overriding
interest in advancing progress by adding knowledge to the public domain is served by
retroactively increasing the inventor’s compensation for a completed invention’.130
This view was supported by an amici curiae brief in support of Eldred’s position written
by a number of prominent economists (including Kenneth J. Arrow, Ronald Coase, Linda Cohen,
and Milton Friedman).131 In addition to arguing that the present value of additional compensation
to authors flowing from copyright term extension in new works is ‘small, very likely an
improvement of less than 1% compared to the pre-CTEA term’, these economists argued that
‘[t]he term extension for existing works makes no significant contribution to an author’s
incentive to create, since in this case the additional compensation was granted after the relevant
investment had already been made’.132 The brief concludes that ‘[t]aken as a whole, it is highly
unlikely that the economic benefits from copyright extension under the CTEA outweigh the
additional costs’.133

130

Eldred v Ashcroft 537 US 186 at 226.
Brief of George A. Akerlof et al as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186
(2002) (No. 01-618)
132
Ibid at 2.
133
Ibid at 3. For other studies that engage with the question of the evidence for and against copyright term extension,
see Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law, “Review of the Economic Evidence Relating to an
Extension of the Term of Copyright in Sound Recordings” (University of Cambridge, 2006), IIL, The IViR Report,
Institute for Information Law (University of Amsterdam, 2006), PwC, The Impact of Copyright Extension for Sound
131

33
Applying the second criticism noted in Whatcott in the context of overbreadth, might the
impugned provisions of the Copyright Act be seen as having a ‘chilling effect’ on debate or
expression?134 This question – in the context of certain provisions of the Criminal Code relating
to terrorism – was addressed in the 2012 SCC decision of R v. Khawaja. McLachlin C.J., who
wrote the reasons for judgment for the Court, discussed the ‘evidentiary basis … required to
establish that legislation has a chilling effect on the exercise of s. 2 freedoms’.135 As she noted,
while ‘[i]n some situations, a chilling effect can be inferred from known facts and experience’, in
other instances it is necessary ‘to call evidence of a chilling effect’.136 McLachlin C.J. held that
in the case of Khawaja, ‘it is impossible to infer, without evidence, that the motive clause will
have a chilling effect on the exercise of s. 2 freedoms by people holding religious or ideological
views similar to those held by some terrorists’.137
It can be argued that the broad prohibition on the use of copyrighted material set out in
the Copyright Act creates a chilling effect on the unauthorized use of copyrighted works, or on
the circulation of ideas more generally.138 Some individuals may choose not to express
themselves using copyrighted works rather than risk a copyright infringement lawsuit. However,
although there is a substantial body of literature in the context of copyright that addresses the
issue of ‘chilling effects,’ the majority of this research has been done in the context of the United
States, and not in Canada.139 Thus, there is a lack of definitive evidence establishing the
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existence of a chilling effect resulting from the impugned provisions of Canada’s Copyright
Act.140 This absence of evidence may lead to courts declining to find the impugned provisions
invalid on the basis of overbreadth.
Applying the third criticism noted in Whatcott in the context of overbreadth, do the
impugned provisions of the Copyright Act ‘give legislative priority to freedom of expression’?141
In some ways, they can be seen to do so. For instance, the Copyright Act protects neither
information nor ideas.142 Furthermore, the rights of copyright owners with respect to works are
limited both in scope and in duration.143 Additionally, the Copyright Act – by providing
mechanisms through which copyright owners can enjoin the unauthorized use of works in which
they own copyright – can be seen as giving legislative priority to the freedom of expression
interests of authors that continue to own copyright in works that they create.
In other ways, however, the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act do not give
legislative priority to freedom of expression (specifically the freedom of expression interests of
non-copyright owning parties). For instance, the structure of the Copyright Act, rather than
giving legislative priority to the freedom of expression interests of non-copyright owning parties,
gives legislative priority to the property rights of copyright owners. Under the impugned
provisions of the Copyright Act, all unauthorized use by non-copyright owning parties of a
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substantial part of copyrighted works is, at first instance, prohibited. The non-copyright owning
party – should they wish to have their use deemed non-infringing – must establish a defence to
copyright infringement. Given the cost of defending a lawsuit in court,144 it can be asked whether
it is likely that individuals that might be able to benefit from the defences as set out in the
Copyright Act will be in a position to exercise this right.
As well, there is no mention of freedom of expression in the Copyright Act. The absence
of a provision in the Copyright Act confirming the importance of freedom of expression can be
contrasted with, among other examples, the hate speech provisions of Saskatchewan’s Human
Rights Code.145 In s. 14(2) of the Human Rights Code, it is stated that ‘[n]othing in subsection (1)
restricts the right of freedom of expression under the law upon any subject’.146 The SCC, in
Whatcott, cited this provision as an indication that ‘[t]he Saskatchewan legislature recognized the
importance of freedom of expression’, and noted that ‘[t]he legislative objective of the entire
provision is to address harm from hate speech while limiting freedom of expression as little as
possible’ (emphasis added).147 The absence of an equivalent provision in the context of the
Copyright Act could be interpreted as an indication that Parliament has not recognized the
importance of freedom of expression in the context of copyright.
Applying the fourth criticism noted in Whatcott in the context of overbreadth, the
impugned provisions of the Copyright Act restrict private communications. For instance, if Party
A sends an email to Party B that contains a copyrighted attachment, and Party B opens and
downloads this attachment, this could constitute copyright infringement under the Copyright Act,
in that Party B could be found to have infringed copyright by reproducing the work. In order for
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Party B’s act to be found not to be infringing, Party B must establish that their act was covered
by a defence to copyright infringement, such as fair dealing.
Applying the fifth criticism noted in Whatcott in the context of overbreadth, the
Copyright Act does not require intention for a determination of copyright infringement to be
made out. In order to infringe copyright under the Copyright Act, parties do not have to intend to
commit copyright infringement; they must merely commit a prima facie infringing act for which
no defence applies. As noted by Teitelbaum J. in Michelin, ‘the intention of the infringer,
whether or not in commercial competition with the copyright holder, is irrelevant to the question
of infringement’.148
Applying the sixth criticism noted in Whatcott in the context of overbreadth, the
Copyright Act does not require proof of actual harm for a finding of copyright infringement.
Proof that a party has done something that the copyright owner has the right to do, and that there
is no available defence, is sufficient to ground a successful action for copyright infringement.
Though the party whose copyright has been infringed is entitled to an accounting of profits, they
can alternatively elect to recover an award of statutory damages.149 Under the statutory damages
regime, parties whose copyright has been infringed can receive damages without demonstrating
actual harm.
The creation of a statutory regime through which liability is imposed without a
requirement that harm be demonstrated is not unique to copyright. Such an approach also exists
in the context of hate speech. Rothstein J., who delivered the judgment of the Court in Whatcott,
wrote that ‘the imposition of preventive measures that do not require proof of actual harm’ can
be justified in part by ‘the difficulty of establishing a causal link between an expressive
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statement and the resulting hatred’.150 A similar justification has been used to justify the
imposition of statutory damages regimes in the context of copyright.151
As noted in Whatcott, in some situations in which it is difficult to establish a causal link
between the act and the harm flowing from the act, courts have accepted that a ‘reasonable
apprehension of harm’ approach should be applied. Under this approach, as noted by Rothstein
J., ‘a precise causal link for certain societal harms [is] not … required. A court is entitled to use
common sense and experience in recognizing that certain activities … inflict societal harms’.152
Rothstein J. continues by noting that:
In Thomson Newspapers Co., this Court recognized that a reasonable
apprehension of harm test should be applied in cases where ‘it has
been suggested, though not proven, that the very nature of the
expression in question undermines the position of groups or
individuals as equal participants in society’ (para. 115). Such an
approach is warranted ‘when it is difficult or impossible to establish
scientifically the type of harm in question’ (para. 115).153
Should a ‘reasonable apprehension of societal harm’ test be applied in the context of the
unauthorized use of copyrighted works or should ‘a precise causal link’ be required?154 It could
be argued that certain types or instances of unauthorized uses of copyrighted works undermine
the position of authors as equal participants in society. One example where this might be the case
is where someone creates a work which is then acquired and published, without authorization
and without compensation, by a different individual (a Cinar Corp-type situation). The act of
publication of this work conveys meaning and thus prima facie constitutes expression under s.
2(b). However, it also impacts the ability of the author to act as an equal participant by denying
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them all financial benefits from the commercialization of their creation. In this type of situation,
a Court might not ‘demand a scientific demonstration or the submission of definitive social
science evidence to establish that the line drawn by Parliament was perfectly drawn’.155
However, not all instances or types of copyright infringement can be seen as undermining
the position of an author as an equal participant in society. For instance, in what ways are authors
impacted by the unauthorized, non-commercial use of their works by individuals for their own
creative endeavours? Even if the author has lost a potential licensing fee, can this be said to
undermine the position of an author as an equal participant in society? In this type of situation, it
could be argued that a reasonable apprehension of harm test should not be applied, and the
plaintiff should be required to demonstrate proof of economic harm.
The seventh criticism noted in Whatcott is that legislation, in order not to be found to be
overbroad, ‘should provide for defences, such as a defence of truth’.156 A number of defences are
set out in the Copyright Act. As well, both the number and scope of defences were expanded as
part of the 2012 copyright amendment process. These defences can be seen as providing space
within which non-copyright owners can express themselves using copyrighted works.157
Questions can be raised, however, as to whether these defences are sufficiently broad, as well as
whether they are too vaguely worded to be useful to defendants.158
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Based on the discussion as outlined above, although the impugned provisions fall
squarely within the range of reasonably supportable alternatives that could have been selected by
Parliament to address the objective of providing an incentive for the creation and dissemination
of expression, it is possible – based on the SCC’s decisions in Whatcott and Khawaja – that the
impugned provisions of the Copyright Act could be held to fail to meet the minimal impairment
requirement on the basis that they are overbroad. In light of this, it is useful to apply the third and
final step of the proportionality analysis.
iii.

Do the benefits outweigh the deleterious effects
The last part of the s. 1 analysis, as described in Whatcott, ‘requires an assessment of

whether the importance of the legislative objective of [the impugned provision…] outweighs the
deleterious effects of the provision’.159 In engaging in this balancing exercise, the value of the
expression must be considered. L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, and Bastarache JJ, in their dissenting
judgment in R. v. Sharpe, wrote that:
The more distant the expression from the core values underlying the
right, the more likely action restricting it can be justified … Defamatory
libel, hate speech and pornography are far removed from the core values
of freedom of expression and have been characterized as low value
expression, which merits an attenuated level of constitutional protection
… These forms of expression receive an attenuated level of constitutional
protection not because a lower standard of justification is applied to the
government, but because the low value of the expression is more easily
outweighed by the objective of the infringing legislation.160
What is the importance of the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act? In the context
of the case study that is the subject of this paper, one can question what benefits flow from
granting additional protection to works already created.161 On the other hand, the deleterious

159

Whatcott at para. 147.
Sharpe at para. 181.
161
See , Brief of George A. Akerlof et al as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186
(2002) (No. 01-618), Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law, “Review of the Economic Evidence
160

40
effects of these provisions may include restrictions being placed on the work’s circulation (which
could impact upon the ability of individuals to access the expression, which in turn might impact
individuals’ ability to use this expression in the service of self-fulfillment, truth-finding, or
democratic discourse). These negative effects might be particularly severe in the context of
works that are not widely available.
Do the deleterious effects of these provisions outweigh their beneficial impacts? In
considering this question, courts must balance a number of factors, including whether the
expression in question is ‘low value’ expression. Is A’s use of copyrighted expression ‘low
value’ expression similar to defamatory libel,162 hate speech,163 information about tobacco
products and product brands,164 and pornography?165 If it can be characterized as such, then it is
possible that the benefits outlined above – however marginal they might be – might be found to
outweigh the detrimental effects.
Expression that has been characterized by the SCC as ‘low value’ does not advance, to
any great degree, the core values of freedom of expression (namely the search for truth, selffulfillment, and political participation). For instance, Sopinka J., in Butler, wrote that:
the distribution of sexually explicit materials accompanied by violence,
and those without violence that are degrading or dehumanizing … lies far
from the core of the guarantee of freedom of expression in that it appeals
only to the most base aspect of individual fulfilment, and it is primarily
economically motivated.166
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However, the expressive act in the case study considered in this paper advances the core
values of freedom of expression. Specifically, A’s making available works the copyright in
which would have expired were it not for a legislative amendment extending the term of
copyright advances the search for truth by making these works accessible to a broader range of
individuals, enhances the self-fulfilment of all who read the works who would otherwise not
have done so by giving them the opportunity to engage with its content, and, depending on the
nature of the works made available and the actions taken by individuals after engaging with the
works, may enhance participation in social and political decision making.
The question of whether the expression is of low value, however, is not the only question
to be considered in this aspect of the s. 1 analysis. As noted in Whatcott, the freedom of
expression values furthered by the expression in question must also be balanced ‘with competing
Charter rights and other values essential to a free and democratic society’.167 Other competing
Charter rights that must be balanced in the context of the s. 1 analysis in the context of the case
study in question are the freedom of expression rights of the public, and the freedom of
expression rights of authors, whether or not they continue to own copyright in the works that
they create.168
Furthermore, other rights that might need to be balanced, as a result of the SCC decision
in Cinar Corp. v. Robinson, are the property rights of copyright owners, and authors’ rights to
inviolability and to dignity.169 It is unclear, however, whether infringements of the authors’ rights
to inviolability and to dignity could be held to have occurred in all instances of copyright
infringement, or only in situations where the author remains the copyright owner. As well, it is
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unclear whether infringements of these two rights could be held to have occurred in all instances
of copyright infringement, or only in cases analogous to Cinar Corp.
Canadian courts have also held that balancing, in the context of the s. 1 analysis, should
‘take into account Canada's international obligations with respect to international law treaty
commitments’.170 As stated in Whatcott, ‘[t]hose commitments reflect an international
recognition that certain types of expression may be limited in furtherance of other fundamental
values’.171 In the context of copyright, international obligations that should be considered include
international copyright and intellectual property treaties and conventions that Canada has signed
and are in force, namely the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performs, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations, the WIPO Convention, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the WIPO
Performance and Phonograms Treaty, and TRIPS.172
Canada’s international commitments, however, are not limited to copyright or intellectual
property more broadly. Other types of treaties and international commitments that should be
considered in the balancing process include human rights treaties such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Declaration on the Rights of
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Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.173
Ultimately, a Canadian court could determine that the benefits of the impugned provisions – in
the context of the case study considered in this paper, or in other contexts as discussed in the
conclusion – might not outweigh their detrimental effects.
4. Remedies
In the previous section, I argued that in the context of the case study discussed in this
paper (as well as in several other contexts), the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act,
described above, might not be justified through the application of a s. 1 analysis. A court could
find that these provisions are not justified on the basis that they are overbroad, or that the
deleterious effects of the provisions outweigh their beneficial effects. This section will examine
the options available to a court should it determine that the impugned provisions of the
Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression.
Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 states that ‘[t]he Constitution of Canada is the
supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution
is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect’.174 Multiple remedies, including
striking down, severing, and reading in, are available to a court under s. 52(1).175 As described in
the above analysis, if the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act are to fail a s. 1 analysis,
they will likely do so either on the basis that they are not minimally impairing, or that the
benefits flowing from the provisions do not outweigh their detrimental effects (the second or
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third elements of the proportionality test). Certain remedies – namely ‘[s]triking down, severing
or reading in’ – are associated with Charter violations that fail these steps of the s. 1 analysis.176
Canadian courts are limited in their ability to read in or sever elements of statutory
provisions. In Schachter, it is noted that severance and reading in are appropriate remedies only
where the inconsistency or the extension ‘can be defined with some precision on the basis of the
requirements of the Constitution’.177 As Lamer J. noted in his majority reasons in Schachter, in
situations in which ‘the question of how the statute ought to be extended in order to comply with
the Constitution cannot be answered with a sufficient degree of precision on the basis of
constitutional analysis … it is the legislature's role to fill in the gaps, not the court's’.178
This principle is directly on point in the context of copyright. In the previous section, I
argued that a court could conclude that the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act are
overbroad. That is to say, as described in JTI and Whatcott, and applied in the context of
copyright, a court could determine that the impugned provisions either ‘on [their] face catch[]
more expression than necessary to meet the legislator’s objective’,179 or are overbroad due to
vagueness.
Depending on how the offending provisions are drafted, severing might be the most
appropriate remedy. This would only be the case, however, if the offending portion could be
severed without the court being required to ‘fill in … details’ 180 or to ‘make ad hoc choices’.181
If it is held that there are a number of ways through which the impugned provisions could be
modified so as to address concerns relating to overbreadth (for instance by expanding defences to
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copyright infringement, or by adopting new interpretive principles), then severance and reading
in would be inappropriate.
Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v. New Brunswick was a decision
in which Gonthier J. noted that multiple approaches could be taken to remedy the Charter breach
in question.182 Given this, Gonthier J. stated that ‘it is not appropriate for this Court to dictate the
approach that should be taken in order to rectify the situation. Since there is more than one way
to do so, it is the government's task to determine which approach it prefers’.183 Attempts by
courts to re-craft the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act could be criticized on the basis
that they ‘amount to making ad hoc choices from a variety of options’, and that in so doing,
courts are paying insufficient respect to the role of the legislature.184
This argument – that it would be inappropriate for a Canadian court to craft legislative
amendments to remedy copyright’s constitutional issues in contexts where there is more than one
way in which these amendments could be framed – is given support by the SCC’s decision in
Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario.185 McLachlin J. wrote the judgment of
the Court in Rocket, in which it was found that the impugned regulation violated s. 2(b) of the
Charter and could not be justified under s. 1 on the basis of overbreadth.
In Rocket, rather than reading in additional exceptions, the SCC struck down the
regulation. It did so due in large part to the structure of the regulation itself, which – as noted by
McLachlin J. – ‘starts with an absolute prohibition on all advertising, [and goes]… on to set out
exceptions’.186 McLachlin J., in Rocket, referred to this method of legislative drafting as one
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which is ‘almost certain to raise the spectre of Charter infringement’.187 As stated by McLachlin
J., ‘[b]ecause the section is cast in the form of limited exclusions to a general prohibition, the
Court would be required to supply further exceptions. To my mind, this is for the legislators’.188
It could be argued that in a manner similar to Rocket, the prohibition of use of copyrightprotected expression ‘would be justifiable if additional exceptions were added’.189 For instance,
it could be argued that if additional categories were incorporated into the fair dealing defence, or
if additional defences themselves were created, that this could address concerns of overbreadth
(both in the context of the case study considered in this paper or more broadly). However,
following Rocket, the creation of additional exceptions would be a matter for the legislators, and
not for the courts.
Given the limitations noted above with respect to reading in and severance as possible
remedies, a court could find that the most appropriate remedy, should it be determined that one
or more of the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act are not justified through the application
of a s. 1 analysis, would be for the court to issue a declaration of invalidity. To what should this
declaration of apply? As described earlier this paper, the impugned provisions – those that I have
argued restrict the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression – are s. 27(1) of the Copyright Act (the
general infringement provision), when read in context with the provisions granting rights in
works (ss. 3 and 5), the primary remedy provisions (ss. 34, 38.1 and 42), and the provisions
setting out defences (ss. 29-30.9) and other limitations to copyright (for instance term limits, as
amended (ss. 6-12)).190 Considerable overlap exists between a number of these provisions. The
general infringement provision (s. 27(1)), for instance, can only be understood in light of the
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provision articulating the rights granted to copyright owners (s. 3), the provision setting out the
conditions of subsistence of copyright (s. 5), and the provision setting out the term of copyright
(ss. 6-12). It would thus be difficult for a court to remedy any constitutional issue involving these
provisions by invalidating a single provision.
A similar fact situation is found in R v. Guignard (Guignard).191 In Guignard, Lebel J.,
writing for the SCC, held that ‘[b]ecause of the considerable overlap between the definitions and
the provision imposing the ban, the declaration of nullity must apply to both the definition and
the ban itself’.192 This passage from Guignard suggests that should one or more impugned
provisions be found to be inconsistent with the Charter, all overlapping provisions could (and
perhaps should) be struck down. Drawing from McLachlin C.J.’s judgment in Bedford,
Parliament would then be able to ‘devise a new approach, reflecting different elements of the
existing regime’.193
Should this declaration extend beyond specific provisions to the legislation as a whole?
This question has been addressed by the SCC in several decisions, including M v. H and Alberta
(Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401
(Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner)).194 One question to be asked in considering
this issue is whether Parliament would have enacted the legislation without the impugned
provisions. If it cannot be assumed that it would have done so, then this is an indication that the
statute should be struck down in its entirety.
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In M v. H, the SCC determined that the legislature would have enacted the legislation
without the impugned (and constitutionally impermissible) provisions.195 In the context of the
case study canvassed in this paper, it might be assumed that Parliament would have enacted the
copyright term extension without making it retroactive. However, in other contexts in which the
constitutionality of copyright is challenged, this assumption might not be valid.
One decision in which the SCC determined that it could not conclude that the legislature
would have enacted the legislation without the impugned (and constitutionally impermissible)
provisions was Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner).196 This decision dealt with the
constitutionality of specific provisions of Alberta’s Personal Information Protection Act
(PIPA).197 Abella and Cromwell JJ, writing for the Court, stated that ‘[g]iven the comprehensive
and integrated structure of the statute, we do not think it is appropriate to pick and choose among
the various amendments that would make PIPA constitutionally compliant’.198 As a result, the
SCC struck down PIPA in its entirety.
Similar to PIPA, the Copyright Act possesses an integrated structure. The primary
infringement provision (s. 27), for instance, must be read together with the rights-granting
provision (s. 3 for works), which itself must be read alongside the provison detailing the
conditions for subsistence of copyright (s. 5) and the provisions setting out the term of copyright
in works (ss. 6-12). Given the integrated structure of the Copyright Act, and following Alberta
(Information and Privacy Commissioner), it can be argued that should it be found that one or
more provisions of the Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe the Charter-protected right to
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freedom of expression, that it may be more appropriate to strike down the Copyright Act in its
entirety than to invalidate a specific provision or a number of provisions.
In suggesting that a declaration of invalidity might be the most appropriate remedy in
certain contexts, the next question that must be asked is whether the declaration of invalidity
should apply immediately, or whether it would be appropriate for the Court to grant a temporary
suspension of this declaration. Canadian courts have indicated their discomfort in granting a
suspended declaration of invalidity. In Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, for instance, LeBel
and Rothstein JJ, writing for the majority, stated that the effect of granting a suspended
declaration of invalidity is to ‘[extend] the life of an unconstitutional law’.199 As noted by
Deschamps J. in her dissenting reasons in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law
v. Canada (Attorney General), ‘[g]enerally, the Court should be wary of allowing or appearing to
condone a continued state of affairs that violates Charter rights’.200
Guidance was given by the SCC in Schachter as to the types of situations in which
temporary suspensions of invalidity could be issued. Lamer C.J., who delivered the reasons for
judgment for the majority, wrote that a suspension of invalidity is ‘clearly appropriate where the
striking down of a provision poses a potential danger to the public … or otherwise threatens the
rule of law’.201 Lamer C.J. also suggested that suspensions of invalidity ‘may also be appropriate
in cases of underinclusiveness as opposed to overbreadth’.202 In these types of cases, were an
underinclusive law to be struck down, deserving persons might be deprived of benefits ‘without
providing them to the applicant’.203 Since Schachter, other justifications for granting a temporary
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suspension of invalidity have been articulated by the SCC in cases such as Bedford and
Kingstreet Investments Ltd v. New Brunswick (Finance).204
The possibility that a court might grant a declaration of invalidity should impugned
provisions of the Copyright Act (or the Copyright Act in its entirety) be found to be invalid is
supported by the reasoning from the three cases noted above (Schachter, Bedford, and
Kingstreet). First, although striking down the Copyright Act would pose no risk to public safety,
it would deprive deserving people of benefits (for instance authors who are copyright owners
whose works could be used by anyone in any context (including a commercially competitive
context) without the possibility of recourse). Second, drawing from Bedford, it can be suggested
that given the increasing prominence of copyright in Canadian public discourse, ‘moving
abruptly from a situation where [intangible expression] is regulated to a situation where it is
entirely unregulated would be a matter of great concern to many Canadians’.205 Third, given
economic data on the importance of copyright to Canada’s economy, it is likely that – as was the
case in Kingstreet – evidence would be led ‘establishing a real concern about fiscal chaos’
should the Copyright Act be struck down.206
If a temporary suspension is granted, for how long might it be granted? The SCC has
suspended declarations of invalidity under the Charter in 21 decisions.207 In all but one case, the

204

Bedford at para. 167, Kingstreet Investments Ltd v New Brunswick (Finance) 2007 SCC 1 at para. 25.
Bedford at para. 167. In 2009, Canada’s federal government launched a public consultation on copyright in
conjunction with the introduction of Bill C-61 (Government of Canada, ‘Copyright Consultations’ (Government of
Canada) <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/008.nsf/eng/home> accessed January 8, 2015). Geist writes that ‘[t]here were
ultimately more than 8,300 submissions - more than any government consultation in recent memory’: Michael
Geist, ‘The Final Copyright Consultation Numbers: No Repeat of Bill C-61’ (Michael Geist, April 9, 2010)
<http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2010/04/copycon-final-numbers/> accessed January 8, 2015.
206
Kingstreet Investments Ltd v New Brunswick (Finance) at para. 25. See, for instance, CONNECTUS Consulting,
The Economic Impact of Canadian Copyright Industries - Sectoral Analysis (2006), Conference Board of Canada,
Valuing Culture (2008).
207
This paper is current as of 12 March 2016.
205

51
SCC granted suspensions of either six, 12, or 18 months.208 In total, in two out of 21 cases (10%)
in which suspensions of invalidity were granted, the SCC suspended the declaration for a period
of 18 months;209 in 11 out of 21 cases (52%), the SCC suspended the declaration for a period of
12 months;210 and in seven out of 21 cases (33%), the SCC suspended the declaration for a
period of six months.211
However, the last case in which the SCC suspended a declaration of invalidity for a
period of other than 12 months was the 2003 decision of Nova Scotia (Worker’ Compensation
Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur.212 Since this date, the
SCC has granted suspended declarations of invalidity in nine cases, all of which for a period of
12 months.213 Statistically, it appears most likely that if a court decides to suspend a declaration
of invalidity, that it would do so for a period of 12 months.
This statistical analysis is supported by remarks, made by the SCC, as to the appropriate
length of time for which to suspend the effect of a declaration of invalidity. In Corbiere v.
Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), the effect of the declaration of invalidity was
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suspended for 18 months.214 L’Heureux-Dubé J. referred to the length of this suspension, in her
dissenting reasons, as ‘longer than the period that would normally be allotted in order to give
legislators the time necessary to carry out extensive consultations and respond to the needs of the
different groups affected’.215 A suspension of 12 months, on the other hand, was referred to by
Lamer C.J. in his dissenting reasons in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General) as
‘giv[ing] Parliament adequate time to decide what, if any, legislation should replace [the
impugned provision]’.216
5. Conclusion
In this paper I have explored, in the context of a case study relating to copyright term
extension, both whether specific provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act infringe the Charter right
to freedom of expression, and, if so, whether they can be justified through the application of a s.
1 analysis. These questions were considered by Teitelbaum J. in Michelin. As noted above,
Teitelbaum J. held that specific provisions of the Copyright Act did not infringe the Charterprotected right to freedom of expression and, even if they did, they would be saved by a s. 1
analysis. Since Michelin, these conclusions have been treated by Canadian courts as settled.
A number of commentators, however, including David Fewer, Jane Bailey, Carys Craig, and Bita
Amani, have argued that these conclusions ought not to be seen as settled, and that elements of
Canada’s Copyright Act, as written or as applied, are inconsistent with the s. 2(b) right to
freedom of expression.217 This paper, in which I resituate the analysis of copyright’s
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constitutionality in light of recent SCC jurisprudence in the areas of both copyright and freedom
of expression, adds to and builds on these works.
Specifically, I have argued that A’s making available of copyrighted works (the
unauthorized act at the heart of the case study considered in this paper) constitutes protectable
expression, and that core provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act infringe the Charter right to
freedom of expression in purpose and effect. As well, I have argued that these provisions might
not be justified through the application of a s. 1 analysis. Drawing in particular from the SCC’s
decision in Whatcott, I have argued that although the impugned provisions should be seen as
rationally connected to this objective, they may be found to be overbroad, and thus not
minimally impairing. As well, it could be found that the beneficial effects of the provisions are
not proportionate to their detrimental effects.
If the determination is made that the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act infringe s.
2(b), and that this infringement cannot be justified under s. 1, the question turns to remedies. In
the context of the case study considered in this paper, I suggested that the constitutionality of the
impugned provision could be addressed by severing part of the provision. Depending on how the
provision is drafted, however, my analysis of relevant SCC case law suggests that – perhaps
surprisingly – in order to avoid usurping the role of Parliament, a court considering the
constitutionality of specific provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act should strike down either part
of the Copyright Act, or the Copyright Act in its entirety, rather than trying to re-shape the
Copyright Act (for instance through the addition of exceptions or defences to copyright
infringement). I have argued that if a court takes this approach, it is likely that any declaration of
invalidity would be suspended for a period of 12 months. Such a remedy would give Parliament
Bailey, for instance, suggests that the ‘[Copyright] Act as currently structured cannot be assumed to be consistent
with freedom of expression, and that the justifiability of the violation is by no means a foregone conclusion –
particularly in the digital networked context’ (Bailey, supra note 4 at 156).
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the opportunity to remake Canada’s Copyright Act in ways that are consistent with what the
Charter requires.
The purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate that the Copyright Act is not immune
from freedom of expression scrutiny; that certain provisions of the Copyright Act, depending on
the context in which they are engaged, may unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to freedom of
expression; and that, as a result, Canadian courts should reconsider the relationship between the
Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright.
A number of possible consequences could flow from Canadian courts choosing to
reconsider the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright. First,
reconsidering the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright would
provide Canadian courts with opportunities for further engagement with a number of legal issues
that merit attention. For instance, reconsidering the intersection of the Charter right to freedom
of expression and copyright would provide additional opportunities for Canadian courts to
engage with the question of the purpose or objective of copyright. As described above, the
purpose of copyright is an integral aspect of both the s. 2(b) and s. 1 analyses under the Charter.
In Cinar Corp – the decision in which McLachlin C.J. wrote that copyright ‘seeks to
ensure that an author will reap the benefits of his efforts, in order to incentivize the creation of
new works’218 – she also demonstrated an openness to considering additional justifications of
copyright through her characterization of the acts of copyright infringement in Cinar as having
violated Robinson’s ‘personal rights to inviolability and to dignity’.219 Reconsidering the
intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright would provide Canadian

218
219

Cinar at para. 23.
Cinar at para. 114.

55
courts with additional opportunities to consider the extent to which values such as dignity and
autonomy – among others – either are or should be embedded within Canadian copyright law.
Reconsideration of the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright could also result in further modifications being made to the s. 2(b) and s. 1 analyses
themselves, as well as creating additional opportunities for courts and commentators to engage in
further consideration of the intersection of copyright and other Charter-protected rights, or of the
intersection of intellectual property rights other than copyright and the Charter.
Second, in addition to providing opportunities for further consideration of a number of
legal issues that merit attention, reconsideration of the intersection of the Charter right to
freedom of expression and copyright, by Canadian courts, could lead to more individuals
choosing to engage – in different ways, and from different perspectives – with respect to this
intersection. For instance, consideration by the SCC of the intersection of the Charter right to
freedom of expression and copyright might lead to a spike in empirical research on copyright law
topics. As noted above, evidence plays an important role in the s. 1 analysis. It can be used both
by government to ‘justify the law’s impact in terms of society as a whole’, or by other parties
(including interveners) to argue that the law is neither rationally connected to the objective nor
minimally impairing.220 Choudhry writes that ‘the central debate in many section 1 cases is the
quality of the evidentiary record’.221
Reconsideration of the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright by Canadian courts could also result in Canadian constitutional and freedom of
expression scholars choosing to engage with the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of
expression and copyright to a greater degree than has previously been the case. In three of the
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most prominent constitutional law casebooks and textbooks used in Canadian law schools, no
reference is made to copyright in the context of freedom of expression.222 Engagement with this
intersection by constitutional scholars would bring a perspective that is thus far lacking in
Canadian commentary in this area.
Third, reconsideration of the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression
and copyright, by Canadian courts, could also lead courts in other jurisdictions to reconsider the
way in which they approach this intersection. Anne-Marie Slaughter has described the SCC as
‘highly influential, apparently more so than the US Supreme Court and other older and more
established constitutional courts’.223 The way in which the SCC articulates the relationship
between freedom of expression and copyright may thus influence the articulation of this
relationship in other jurisdictions.
Fourth, as argued above, reconsideration of the intersection of the Charter right to
freedom of expression and copyright, by Canadian courts, could result in certain provisions of
the Copyright Act being declared of no force or effect, which would necessitate reform of
Canada’s Copyright Act. In this paper, the case study relied on focused on copyright term
extension. However, as noted above, I am not suggesting that my conclusions are restricted to
this specific case study. Other case studies that could have been considered include those in
which fair dealing’s limits are challenged (for instance if an individual creates a ‘transformative
work’ that, although fair, falls outside of the fair dealing categories224); those in which an
individual is sued for copyright infringement for making an unauthorized, personal copy of a
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work; those that challenge Canada’s moral rights regime (for instance due to the absence of freestanding defences to moral rights infringement); or those that challenge the provisions in
Canada’s Copyright Act that make it an offence, in certain circumstances, to circumvent
technological protection measures.
In any of the contexts outlined above, a declaration that all or part of the Copyright Act is
of no force or effect would create an opportunity for governments, non-governmental
organisations, corporations, artists, and scholars (among other groups and interested parties) to
suggest ways through which to re-make copyright in ways that would be consistent with the
Charter; for ‘[c]ourts, and writers on freedom of speech as well as on copyright’ – as Eric
Barendt argues – to ‘confront th[e] clash of speech and property rights openly, and develop
principles under which an appropriate accommodation of the two rights can be reached in
concrete cases’.225 This could also result in opportunities for a broader reconsideration of the
aims of copyright, and the way in which copyright achieves these aims – not simply the way in
which copyright impacts upon expression.
These are only a few of the consequences, among others, that could flow from Canadian
courts choosing to reconsider their approaches to the intersection of the Charter right to freedom
of expression and copyright. It is unclear, however, whether such reconsideration will take place.
Lower Canadian courts have shown no sign that they wish to revisit the intersection of the
Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright. Similarly, the SCC has not signalled an
interest in explicitly engaging with this intersection.226
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What is clear, however, on the basis of the analysis set out in this paper, is that the view
that arguments challenging the constitutionality of provisions of the Copyright Act on Charter
right to freedom of expression grounds are ‘bound to fail’ is not correct;227 rather, a Canadian
court could determine that core provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe s.
2(b) of the Charter. Given this, I argue that it is time for the reinvigoration of judicial
consideration of this area; for Canadian courts to explicitly reconsider the constitutionality of
copyright.
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